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of Margin Credit
To foster the "informed use of credit,"1 Congress in 1968 passed
the Truth in Lending Act,2 a comprehensive measure regulating
consumer credit practices. The Act requires merchants and lending
institutions to disclose credit terms to potential customers.3 The dis-
closure provisions, however, do not apply to transactions in which a
broker or dealer furnishes credit to facilitate trading in securities or
commodities accounts.4 Congress specifically exempted these "margin"
credit transactions3 with the understanding that the Securities and
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The legislative history can be found
in Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings]; Truth in Lending-1967: Hearings on
S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings]; H.R.
REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nrws
1962 [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1967 HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 392,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 SENATE REPORT]; 113 CONG. REC.
18399-424 (1967); 114 CONG. REC. 1421-60, 1582-1618, 1831-57 (1968).
3. The Truth in Lending Act is divided into four major sections that deal, respec-
tively, with disclosure of consumer credit costs, control of extortionate credit transactions,
restrictions on garnishment, and creation of a National Commission on Consumer Finance.
The disclosure title requires creditors to inform "each person to whom consumer credit
is extended and upon whom a finance charge is or may be imposed" of the annual
percentage rate represented by the total finance charge. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970). In ad-'
dition, the title mandates disclosure of the methods for determining finance charges and
of the penalties for late payment. Id. §§ 1636-1639. It also requires a "description of any
security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with
the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security
interest relates." Id. § 1638(a)(10).
The maximum penalty for willful and knowing failure to disclose the specified credit
information is a fine of $5000 and/or imprisonment for one year. Id. § 1611. For all non-
criminal violations, the Act prescribes a fine of twice the amount of the charge in ques-
ton (but not less than $100 nor more than $I000), as well as liability (where the con-
sumer's suit is successful) for court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. § 1640(a)
(Supp. V 1975). Creditors are allowed a defense of unintentional and bona fide error if
they maintain "procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." Id. § 1640(c).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1970). See 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; 1967 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
5. "Margin" trading is leveraged speculation on credit in securities or commodities.
Credit usually is extended by a broker; occasionally, it is extended by a bank or other
lending institution. In "long" transactions the customer puts up part of the purchase
price, borrows the balance on margin, and uses the securities or commodities thus pur-
chased as collateral for the margin loan. In "short" sales the customer sells stock he does
not own. The margin loan thus consists of borrowed stock; collateral for the loan is
provided by the funds realized on the sale of this stock. For a simple but comprehensive
explanation of various types of margin transactions, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
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Exchange Commission (SEC) would require "substantially similar dis-
closure."6 The Commission in 1969 responded to this congressional
mandate by promulgating Rule 1Ob-16, which regulates disclosure of
credit terms in margin transactions.
7
The Rule operates simultaneously as consumer legislation, a securi-
ties law, and part of the federal scheme of margin regulation.8 It ful-
fills its various functions unsatisfactorily. This Note contends that the
Rule does not reflect the philosophy of the Truth in Lending Act and
fails to offer effective protection to margin customers. The Note sug-
Smith, Inc., What Is Margin? (March 1976) (pamphlet on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as What Is Margin?]. See generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1248-56 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. 3264-73 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
Minimum cash deposits required for margin transactions have varied from a low of
40% to a high of 100% in the 42 years the federal government has regulated margin.
See 2 L. Loss, supra at 1244-48 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. at 3262-64 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Cur-
rently, a 50% deposit is required for margin transactions in most securities. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 207.5, 220.8, 224.1 (1976). Margins in the commodity markets tend to be much lower.
See generally I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.6(415), at 82.141-.142 (1975).
6. 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1976). The rule requires disclosure of credit terms at the
time a margin account is opened, quarterly reports to the customer at the end of each
quarter, and advance notice of any changes in the terms and conditions of credit.
There has been little academic or judicial discussion of Rule lOb-16. See 1 A. BROs-
BERG, supra note 5, § 2.2 (510), at 22.14 (1975) (summarizing requirements of Rule); 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1050 (1976). The Rule has been the subject of two "no-action" letters by
the SEC, see Freedman, Silverberg & Lewis, Inc. (June 9, 1972); General Electric Co.
(June 17, 1971), and three court decisions, see Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., 540 F.2d
1107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Stephens v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ala. 1976);
Tilly Foster Real Estate Corp. v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 94,073 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
8. The current federal system of margin regulation has three major aspects. The first
deals with margin as a technique of securities trading and strives to prevent the use of
margin as a manipulative device to deceive the public. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1934). The second treats margin as a factor in the level of speculation and,
hence, of market activity and attempts to moderate excessive price fluctuations by
regulating the amount of margin credit outstanding. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1934). The final and broadest aspect of the federal regulatory scheme views
margin as contributing to the size of the money supply and seeks to control margin in
order to influence the economy as a whole. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 82-123, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1952).
This tripartite scheme of margin regulation draws its statutory authority from the
Securities Exchange Act, which empowers the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to set initial
stock margin levels and to control maintenance calls (the demand for additional collat-
eral by the lender), 15 U.S.C. § 78 g (1970), and from the Commodity Exchange Act.
which enables the Commodity Exchange Commission to alter or supplement the ex-
change-established margin requirements, 12 U.S.C. § 12a(7) (Supp. V 1975). The FRB,
however, has never exercised its full authority to regulate margin calls. Hence, most of
the stock exchanges have superimposed their own rules on those of the FRB, and some
of these private regulations have been elevated to quasi-statutory status. See 2 L. Loss,
supra note 5, at 1265-67 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. at 3310-11 (2d ed. Stipp. 1969); Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUZMI. L. REV. 12 (1966); Note,
Civil Liability of a Broker for Failure to Enforce Margin Requirements, 10 WILLAMErrE
L.J. 72, 78-83 (1973). A detailed analysis of the effect of Rule lOb-16 on the federal s)stein
of margin regulation is beyond the scope of this Note.
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gests that Rule lOb-16 be eliminated and that disclosure of interest
rates and other terms of credit in margin accounts be regulated by the
Truth in Lending Act. Margin credit disclosures considered fraudulent
under the Securities Exchange Act of 19349 would be redressable
under procedures already provided by that Act.
I. Truth in Lending and the Genesis of Rule lOb-16
The Truth in Lending Act is principally concerned with the
financially unsophisticated consumer. This solicitude is especially
evident in the interest rate section of the Act:10 it requires easily com-
prehensible rate disclosures,'1 emphasizes enforcement by various gov-
ernmental agencies so that those injured need not hire lawyers,12 and
provides an automatic damage formula linked to the interest charge
in order to eliminate the necessity of proving money damages.' 3 Con-
cern for the financially naive is also apparent from the types of transac-
tions exempted from coverage. The Act does not apply, for example,
to extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes, for projects
involving amounts over $25,000, or for "[t]ransactions in securities or
commodities accounts by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission."'
During hearings before the Senate subcommittee considering the
Truth in Lending bill, James L. Robertson, Vice Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, urged that margin
transactions not be excluded from Truth in Lending. In the view of
the Federal Reserve, Robertson stated, there was "nothing to provide
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
10. The provisions of the Act that pertain to interest rates can be found at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601, 1605-1607, 1631-1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11. Id. §§ 1605-1606, 1631-1639 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See 1967 HousE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 18.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970). Furthermore, although agency enforcement was viewed as
the primary protection for naive consumers, 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 18, the
Act established a private right of action for nondisclosure violations "in connection with
any consumer credit transaction," 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). The section was broadened in
1974 to read "any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement . . . with respect to
any person is liable to such person." Id. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
14. Id. § 1603 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Additional exemptions include extensions of
credit to governmental entities, transactions under certain public utility tariffs, and
transactions "primarily for agricultural purposes in which the total amount to be
financed exceeds $25,000." Id. It was felt that most of these credit transactions iniolved
parties who, because of their status or wealth, would have the financial sophistication
or economic power to enable them to bargain for needed disclosures. See, e.g., 1967
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 677 (Sen. Proxmire).
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comparable protection in [the margin] area."1a Responding to a request
for its opinion, the SEC told the subcommittee that it had the authority
to regulate some margin transactions. 16 In the report that later ap-
peared, the subcommittee's parent committee informed the Senate that
although margin transactions were exempted from the provisions of
the Act, the committee intended the SEC "to require substantially
similar disclosure by regulation as soon as it is possible to issue such
regulations."''
It is unclear whether Congress intended that the SEC merely imple-
ment a disclosure rule identical to the provisions of Truth in Lending,
or whether the SEC received a broad mandate to develop disclosure
provisions designed to protect investors engaged in the specialized field
of trading on margin credit.' In drafting the new Rule lOb-16 the
SEC took the former course; the Rule was designed as a consumer pro-
tection measure. The Commission described the Rule as having been
15. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 676 (James L. Robertson).
16. The Senators believed that the SEC already possessed the power to require the
disclosure of interest rates. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 677 (statement of
Sen. Proxmire). Nonetheless, the subcommittee asked the SEC about its capacity to
regulate stock and commodity margin. The Commission replied that it had authority to
require interest rate disclosure by broker-dealers, reminded the subcommittee members
that it had no direct jurisdiction over commodity transactions, and revealed that it was
conducting discussions with the various stock exchanges about the development of
private rules for margin account disclosures. Id. at 685-86 (letter of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman of SEC). The Commission added that "[w]hatever may eventuate within the
exchanges in this area, the Commission is prepared to adopt its own rules to whatever
extent may be necessary." Id. at 686.
17. 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. The committee's phraseology is ambig-
uous in two respects. The first is purely technical or linguistic and concerns the meaning
of "substantially similar." These words do not indicate precisely whether Congress wanted
requirements facially equivalent to those in Truth in Lending or whether it desired that
the Rule lOb-16 regulations follow the spirit of the Act, even if that meant facially
different rules. The second ambiguity is substantive and concerns, on the one hand,
whether Congress intended to protect certain types of credit transactions or only a cer-
tain class of credit customers. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether Congress was
addressing any problem other than nondisclosure of interest rates, that is, whether Con-
gress intended the SEC to regulate margin maintenance calls. Cf. note 28 infra (discuss-
ing margin maintenance calls). It appears that interest rates may have been the only
real concern. See notes 11-13 supra & note 19 infra.
18. Both possibilities represent a shift from the earlier position of the drafters, which
appears to have been that margin traders are sophisticated investors who do not need
statutory protection. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 677 (Sen. Bennett). The
initial plan had been to leave margin customers in both security and commodity transac-
tions out of the regulatory scheme entirely. Only on the last day of the hearings did the
subcommittee begin the reconsideration of the exemption that led to the eventual decision
to direct the SEC to control disclosures in relation to security margin accounts. See id. at
676-77. rhe fact that the Senators did not provide for regulation of commodity accounts
is somewhat puzzling, since there are no indications that the legislators considered coi-
modity speculators different from, or less deserving of protection than, security specula-
tors. The rather sparse legislative history suggests that congressional intent with regard
to regulation of margin transactions is conflicting.
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adopted in response to a congressional "mandate" arising under the
Truth in Lending Act.'
9
The consumer protection orientation of the Rule is revealed most
clearly in the Commission's explanatory release, which outlines the
benefits of disclosure to margin customers20 in language similar to that
of the preamble of the Truth in Lending Act.21 In at least some
respects, Rule lOb-16 seems to adhere to the system set up by the
Act.22 Nonetheless, the scheme of margin disclosure regulation estab-
lished by Rule lOb-16 fails ultimately to reflect congressional intent as
manifested in Truth in Lending.
II. Rule lOb-16 and the Protection of Margin Customers
Rule 1Ob-16 functions inefficiently as a consumer protection securi-
ties law. The disclosures it requires are of limited value to margin
customers, and the remedies it provides are of equally limited effective-
ness. Moreover, the use of section 10(b) securities antifraud principles
to enforce an essentially consumer-oriented provision imposes restric-
tions on a Rule lOb-16 cause of action that cripple its ability to offer
meaningful consumer protection.
Rule lOb-16 is an attempt to protect a special type of investor, the
margin trader. Although the provisions for disclosure of interest
charges found in the Truth in Lending Act exhibit an intention to
protect purchasers of consumer goods, Rule 1Ob-16 is aimed at rela-
tively wealthy and financially sophisticated individuals engaged in a
19. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8773, December 16, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg.
19,717 (1969).
20. The release said of lOb-16:
The rule requires an initial disclosure and periodic disclosures. The initial dis-
closure is designed to insure that the investor, before his account is opened, under-
stands the terms and conditions under which credit charges will be made. This will
enable him to compare the various credit terms available to him and to understand
the methods used in computing the actual credit charges. The periodic statement
will inform the investor of the actual cost of credit and, with the aid of the initial
disclosure, enable him to accurately assess that cost.
Id. (emphasis added).
21. As Congress originally stated the purpose of the Act:
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by con-
sumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
22. The Rule requires interest rate disclosure similar to that of Truth in Lending,
compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16(a)(1) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975), and
appears on its face to grant broad standing to potential plaintiffs through prohibition
of violations "in connection with any securities transaction," 17 C.F.R. § 24.10b-16(a)
(1976). Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
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complex and speculative investment activity requiring specialized in-
formation.2 3 It is therefore not surprising that the provisions of the
Rule differ in some respects from those of the Act. The main difficulty
with the Rule is not that it fails to mimic the Act, however, but rather
that as a prophylactic consumer protection measure it falls far short of




Margin traders and the consumers protected by the Truth in Lend-
ing Act need different information to make informed decisions. The
consumer purchases goods or services on time; his need is for informa-
tion concerning the cost of using a delayed payment option. Since a
retail consumer is not normally trained in financial matters, he must
have access to a clear, simple explanation of the terms of the loan and
of the practical effect of these terms on the eventual total cost of his
purchase.2 The Truth in Lending Act attempts to meet these needs
and to promote informed use of credit by requiring lenders to disclose,
specifically and uniformly, all interest and finance charges accompany-
ing a consumer credit transaction.2"
The margin trader is, in contrast, engaged in a specialized invest-
ment activity. He needs information in addition to the interest charges
on his margin account. 27 Disclosure requirements for margin creditors,
23. Margin credit differs significantly from other consumer credit. The Act was in-
tended to cover credit used to purchase property, goods, or services "for personal,
family, household, or agricultural purposes," 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970), and the credit
account was to be repaid in regular installments. The Rule covers credit used to finance
speculation in the securities markets. Although finance charges are computed and
posted periodically in margin accounts, payments to reduce the balance are not re-
quired. Instead, margin customers normally eliminate their indebtedness only when
closing out the transactions that gave rise to the loan. Since many margin speculators
trade constantly, they carry debit balances at all times. Those who extend margin credit
do not demand periodic repayment because their lien on the securities or commodities
bought (or the short sale proceeds received and deposited with them) is generally worth
more than the amount of the margin loan, which is extended for only a specified per-
centage of the purchase or sales price.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975).
25. One of the main purposes of credit cost disclosures under the Truth in Lending
Act is to enable financially unsophisticated families to budget their credit charges more
successfully and thus to avoid financial embarrassment. See, e.g., 1967 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 1.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1632, 1636-1639 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Federal Reserve
Board has promulgated regulations that prescribe with precision the methods by which
disclosures must be made to borrowers. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.8 (1976) ("Regulation Z,"
issued pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970)); id. §§ 226.101-1002 (interpretations of Regula-
tion Z).
27. Because margin principal and interest are not due in regular installments, see
note 23 supra, as is the case with other consumer credit, there is little need from a budget-
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insofar as they are deemed necessary, should therefore be less con-
cerned with simplicity and clarity and more concerned with providing
the specialized information required by the margin trader. For the
investor trading on margin, the most important information about
credit terms is the amount of collateral he must maintain on his margin
loan before the lender will make a margin call.2 8 The investor prefers
to know the exact conditions under which the lender will call for more
collateral, and this was likely an important factor in the Commission's
drafting of the Rule.
29
Disclosure under Rule lOb-16 differs from that under the Truth in
Lending Act in ways that reflect the differences between consumer and
margin creditors. The Rule merely requires brokerage houses to dis-
close the interest rate on margin loans; it does not define the method
of computing total finance charges with the same specificity as the
ing point of view to know what the interest charges are. See id., cf. note 25 supra
(budgeting value to other consumers of interest rate disclosures). The interest charged
on the margin loan is for the most part perceived only indirectly by the customer, since
interest is not paid to the broker directly but added to the existing debit balance. The
accumulated interest charges affect the client only when he sells (lessening his profit on
the transaction) or when the debit balance becomes so large that a margin maintenance
call arises. In most instances a margin call occurs not because of accumulated interest, but
because securities prices are moving counter to the client's position in the market.
Margin call standards are thus usually of greater concern to him than the interest rate,
since the former alone involves tender of additional cash or a forced sale. This judgment
was implicit in the SEC's decision to include margin call standards as one of the
categories to be disclosed in Rule 10b-1 and in the correlative relaxation of interest cost
disclosure procedures. Interviews with current and former SEC officials involved with
drafting of Rule lOb-16 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as In-
terviews]. Nonetheless, disclosure of interest rates would at least aid the consumer in
comparing the margin account terms of various brokerage houses. See Liang v. Dean
Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28. If the market value of the collateral declines significantly, the lender will ask for
additional funds. This demand is known as a margin maintenance "call." If the call is
not met, the existing collateral is liquidated to the extent necessary to pay off the
margin loan. In most cases, the margin call is timed so that the original cash tendered is
sufficient to protect the lender from loss. Because margin creditors are virtually assured
of the safety of their loaned funds, interest rates fluctuate only slightly above tile
broker's call rate, which is generally .25% to .5% under the prime. See Wall St. J., Dec.
7, 1976, at 39, col. 5.
29. The consequence of such a disclosure in a theoretical margin system would be to
allow the margin trader to arrange his portfolio in such a way as to permit him to meet
the request for more collateral without serious disruption of his other investment plans.
Practically, however, this portfolio adjustment is not possible because the other unascer-
tainable variable is the rate of price movement in the market. See note 39 infra. Even
those drafting the Rule questioned the benefits of the disclosure it mandated. See In-
terviews, supra note 27. Many recent commentators have expressed skepticism about the
relevance and usefulness to investors of much of the disclosure required generally by the
securities laws or specifically by the SEC. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TilE
STOCK MARKET (1966) (inside information); Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the
SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SECURITIES 26 (H. Manne ed. 1969) (accounting); Kripke, The SEC, the Ac-
countants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1151 (1970) (accounting).
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Act.30 On the other hand, the Rule requires disclosure of the standards
brokerage houses use to determine when they will make margin main-
tenance calls; the Act, of course, contains no similar requirement. 31
Yet despite these attempts to accommodate the needs of margin credi-
tors, the Rule fails to provide useful information and has costly
repercussions on the market for margin credit.
The first judicial consideration of Rule 1Ob-16's disclosure require-
ments concerning the timing of margin maintenance calls was in Liang
v. Dean Witter & Co.32 Under the reasoning in Liang, if a brokerage
firm's system of margin calls is purely discretionary, it need com-
municate to customers opening a margin account no more than the
presence of such discretion.3 3 If, on the other hand, the system of the
30. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1976) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.8 (1976) (Regula-
tion Z). See note 26 supra.
31. The legislative record of the Truth in Lending Act evidences no intent to control
margin beyond requiring disclosure of interest costs of margin loans. This conclusion is
buttressed by the history of a section of the Truth in Lending bill proposed by the House
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs that would have contained a provision for regulation
of margin levels in the commodity markets. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 5,
26. Witnesses at the hearings generally agreed that a bill regulating disclosure of interest
rates charged to consumers was not the proper context for such a provision, see id. at
599-658, and the proposal was dropped by committee amendment, see 114 CONG. REc.
1423, 1435 (1968). The expunging of this section by the committee strengthened the Act's
nature as a purely interest-rate oriented disclosure law. The SEC staff view, as it began
work on Rule 10b-16, was that the Rule was intended by Congress to operate as a con-
sumer protection measure regulating disclosure of the costs of margin credit. See Inter-
views, supra note 27.
32. 540 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1976), discussed in 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1050 (1976). Plaintiffs
had signed a standard form "Customer's Agreement" supplied by defendant broker Dean
Witter, in which the defendant was authorized to require additional collateral if
necessary to protect itself. The Liangs, whose securities were liquidated when a margin
call was not met, alleged a violation of the Rule. 540 F.2d at 1109-10.
In remanding the case, the circuit court stated that Rule lOb-16 did not require the
formulation of any particular margin call standards by brokerage houses. The Rule
merely prescribed disclosure of whatever standard was employed. Id. at 1111. If the
decision to make a margin maintenance call was truly an individual one made without
any guidelines, the disclosure made by Dean Witter would have been sufficient. Id. at
1111-12. If, however, the brokerage firm had developed standards for timing a margin
call, even if they were rule-of-thumb standards irregularly applied, they should have
been revealed to customers. Id. at 1112.
33. The court's definition of a discretionary system was not enlightening. The court
suggested that a "firm may choose to operate on an entirely individual customer basis,
without any general internal guidelines whatsoever; accordingly, it would only have to
disclose that discretion is its sole guide." 540 F.2d at 1111-12. Because the nature of the
disclosure required will hinge on the presence or absence of broker discretion, line-draw-
ing problems caused by the court's less than precise definition will influence the out-
come of many cases.
It is possible that other courts will interpret Rule lOb-16's disclosure requirements dif-
ferently. It could be argued that a statement like Dean Witter's, which merely announced
that the firm could require additional collateral at its discretion, fulfilled the disclosure
requirement. The Liangs were put on notice that there were no set standards. If they
were not willing to put up with the uncertainty, they could go to another broker.
A reading of Rule lOb-16 slightly different from that of the Liang court has already
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brokerage house is not wholly discretionary, 34 it has two choices. It can
adopt and disclose a purely mechanical credit system that treats all
customers alike. Alternatively, the brokerage house can use and disclose
a "sliding scale" system that embodies distinct maintenance call stan-
dards for different classes of margin customers.
In none of the situations contemplated by the reasoning in Liang
would disclosure be likely to provide much assistance to margin clients.
The revelation that a system is purely discretionary would not indicate
to customers when they might get a margin call, the principal informa-
tion that margin customers want.3 Further, disclosure of a "sliding
scale" standard, although seemingly more revealing, would probably
not be helpful either. The value of such information is questionable
in view of the likely complexity of the sliding-scale formula,36 the
been suggested in 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1050, 1063-64 (1976). The author proposes a "factor
test" of compliance, in which brokers must disclose all the relevant factors in their
potential margin call decisions. Following this procedure, even a broker using only dis-
cretion as a guide would have to reveal the multiplicity of elements constituting that
rather vague mental stance. The author states that "[u]nlike the Liang test, the factor
test would require all brokers to make the meaningful disclosure of collateral policies
which rule lOb-16 was designed to provide." Id. at 1063. Practical objections, however,
come to mind. For example, the factor test requires disclosures even more complex than
those currently contemplated by the courts. See notes 36 & 37 infra (quoting broker
disclosure letter).
34. A defendant normally would not find it difficult to convince the court that it uses
a wholly discretionary system. Although the Liang court did not discuss burden of proof,
it seems that the plaintiff would have to demonstrate the existence of a nondiscretionary
system. This is likely because of policy reasons, since courts would probably not want to
make it too easy to bring such potentially expensive and annoying suits. Even if the
burden were placed on the brokerage house, however, it could probably be met by citing
examples of other customers who were not given margin calls according to any postulated
set of guidelines.
It is of course possible that many firms would have some general internal policy that
would be manifested in a pattern of discoverable behavior. Insofar as this is so, and
insofar as the existence of such a mode of brokerage operations would provide a basis of
liability in Liang situations, Rule lOb-16 provides incentives to follow a discretionary
policy, or at least to deviate enough from general standards to create the appearance of
a discretionary policy.
35. See pp. 377-78 and notes 28 & 29 supra.
36. If such a standard were reduced to a formula, it might be-or might easily be
made-so abstruse that one would need to make complicated computations in order to
deal with it. This would be especially true if the formula dealt with different classes of
margin customers rather than treating all accounts equally.
Illustrative of the problems involved is this description of a sliding-scale formula that a
brokerage house recently provided to its customers under Rule lOb-16:
In order to verify interest charges, the average daily net debit balance must first
be ascertained for each interim interest period. This may be done as follows: Multiply
each NET debit balance by the number of days the balance remains unchanged dur-
ing the interim interest period. (The DEBIT balance for EACH DAY during the
interim interest period must be accounted for.) Total these results and divide the
sum by the number of days in the interim interest period. The quotient is the
average daily net debit balance for your account for each interim interest period.
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possibility that discretionary elements would persist in the announced
standards, 37 and the difficulty of monitoring the position of one's ac-
The amount of interest charged for each interim interest period can then be
verified by using the following formula:
Average daily Annual rate No. of days in period
debit balance X of interest X 360 days (per year)
Interest
- charged
The total interest charged for the monthly interest period is the sum of the interest
charged for each interim interest period within the monthly interest period as com-
puted in accordance with the above formula. Because the interest charges disclosed
on any account statement are for a period from the 20th of the preceding month
through the 19th of the month to which the statement relates, you should retain
your prior month's statement for use in connection with the current month's state-
ment, as well as for preparing your income tax returns.
Credit Charges and Margin Requirements (1977) (letter of brokerage firm to its margin
customers, drafted after Liang) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Disclosure Letter].
Such a formula is not impossible to manipulate in order to find the interest charges
imposed on an account. It certainly involves a great deal more complexity, however, than
a routine truth-in-lending interest rate disclosure. Even if the formula were relatively
simple, the fact that interest rates disclosures under Rule lOb-16 are not required to
adhere to any particular format, cf. note 26 supra (listing sections of Truth in Lending
Act and accompanying regulations that explain precisely how interest charges disclosed
are to be computed), means that it may be very difficult to apply the formula usefully,
since the disclosed interest rate may not reflect actual total interest charges. The possible
different computations of interest charges would at the very least make margin account
comparisons for margin customers rather complex. Complexity in using the formula
would be further increased by the fact that interest rates charged on the account are
constantly fluctuating along with the prime rate. See note 28 supra. Careful prediction of
the status of an account is impossible. Such an outcome would conflict with the con-
gressional intent in the Truth in Lending Act, which looked toward simple disclosures that
could be easily used for comparisons and personal financial planning. See notes 11 &
25 supra.
37. The standards announced could simply be guidelines or a formula accompanied
by a set of definitions or categories. Brokerage house discretion would be inherent in
distinctions drawn upon the basis of such factors as "high credit rating," "good cus-
tomer," and "likelihood of repeated transactions."
One of the first disclosures under the Liang interpretation of the Rule reflects some
of these categories:
LIENS AND ADDITIONAL COLLATERAL
This firm may require you to deposit additional collateral in accordance with the
Rules and Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., the American Stock Exchange, Inc., other national securities exchanges and
associations, or any other regulatory agency having jurisdiction. [Firm name deleted]
has a policy of periodically reviewing each account in which the equity, calculated
without giving value to certain over-the-counter and low-priced securities, falls below
35% of the outstanding debit, or where concentration or other factors are deemed to
warrant review. This policy contemplates the maintenance of equity in an account
above that required by any regulatory organization having jurisdiction over this firm,
and the firm examines each such account on an individual basis giving consideration
to a number of factors such as the marketability of the securities in the account, the
frequency of activity, the length of time the account has been open and concentra-
tion in particular issues. Different weight may be given to these factors in reviewing
different accounts, and [firm name deleted] in its sole discretion may, but shall have
no obligation to, require additional collateral on the basis of the review.
Disclosure Letter, supra note 36 (emphasis added).
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count comprehensively enough to apply the formula.38 Moreover, un-
certainty over future market conditions is such an important considera-
tion in determining the likelihood of margin calls under any standard
that, even when a customer is perfectly informed of the circumstances
under which margin calls will be made, he is still subject to a sizeable
economic risk.3 9 Additionally, competition among brokers and uncer-
tainty concerning market conditions make it unlikely that brokers will
employ a purely mechanical maintenance call system, 40 even if such a
system would arguably be of some use to customers attempting to
budget their resources.
Hence the disclosure requirements of Rule lOb-16 will do little to
protect margin investors. First, little may be disclosed, and what is dis-
closed may be incomprehensible. Second, competitive forces and the
desire to find the surest means to avoid liability and expense may push
brokerage houses toward adopting and disclosing purely discretionary
38. Since the value of the stocks in the account would be constantly changing, prox-
imity to a margin call would fluctuate in response. The only way to be certain of the
position of the account would be to watch market prices continually, calculator in hand,
always aware of changes in interest rates that would raise the debt level in the account.
See note 36 supra.
Adding to the difficulty of following the dual factors of market value of securities and
increasing level of debt is the existence of a "Special Miscellaneous Account," which is
used by many brokers for their customers in connection with the "general" margin
account containing the securities. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1976). Any excess funds credited
to the general account or generated through market appreciation are transferred to the
Special Miscellaneous Account where they may be used for later purchases, even though
such purchases through the general account would require the tender of additional cash
or collateral. See What Is Margin?, supra note 5, at 8-9, 10-11. The Special Miscellaneous
Account, whose balance also varies periodically, must be reckoned with in trying to
ascertain proximity to a margin call.
39. Interest charges and allowable debt-equity ratios are only one part of the margin
call equation. The controlling and immediate cause of a margin call is always the move-
ment of stock prices. Hence, even if a margin client knew under exactly what conditions
a call would come, he could still not estimate the timing of the margin call unless he
knew the direction and rate of market movements. Such knowledge, though assiduously
sought, is seldom gained. A customer could thus not use his Rule lOb-16 disclosures to
great advantage in financial planning. For if he tried to keep his assets in less liquid,
higher yielding investments until a margin call occurred, he would have to beat the risk
of an adverse market move rendering such funds necessary before he had anticipated. In
this respect, he would be little better off than the less informed margin customers who
had not known under what conditions they would get a margin call. The only ad-
vantage would be to those speculators who desired to bear the risk of unpredictable
market movements but not of unpredictable margin calls. Since the latter risk depends
on the former, however, this advantage seems of little economic or predictive value.
40. A mechanical system, which could not be adjusted or manipulated to achievc some
flexibility when brokers felt that market conditions were only momentarily out of
balance, would be unattractive to brokers and clients alike. Large investors would
probably prefer a system without standards that allowed them to use their economic
power to bargain for various credit privileges. Such a desire on the part of major cus-
tomers might push brokers into competition against each other to offer the most
amorphous and manipulable margin systems.
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standards for making margin maintenance calls. The net effect of Rule
lOb-16's disclosure requirements will thus probably be to encourage
the adoption of the least informative and most arbitrary systems.
Even if Rule 1Ob-16 prompted some meaningful disclosure, however,
the Rule would still be inconsistent and irrational, since gaps in its
coverage cause customers in essentially similar transactions to be pro-
tected in rather dissimilar ways. The Rule, for example, only applies
to broker-dealers and does not reach banks or other lenders who some-
times extend margin credit.41 As a result, an investor could borrow
against securities from a broker and be covered by Rule lOb-16, yet
borrow the same amount, pledging stock, from a bank and be covered
by the Truth in Lending Act.42 In another instance, distinguishable
only by the increased size of the transaction, a loan from a broker
would be covered by the Rule, but the same loan from a bank would be
beyond the jurisdiction of the Act.43 Functionally equivalent transac-
tions would thus receive different treatment.
Differences in the transactions covered by Rule and Act also under-
mine the congressional purpose of protecting small investors. Congress
exempted transactions exceeding $25,000 from the provisions of the
Truth in Lending Act and thus indicated an intention to protect the
relatively disadvantaged and to let the wealthy and financially sophis-
ticated take care of themselves.4 4 The consequences of the Rule's dis-
closure scheme, however, point in a very different direction. The
absence of an exemption for large transactions in Rule lOb-16 creates
incentives that undermine the disclosure scheme, because, to the extent
41. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1976) (Rule applies only to brokers or dealers). This is,
of course, a direct result of the bifurcation introduced by the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2)
(1970). Previously existing federal regulation of margin in the securities markets, by
contrast, dealt with both broker-dealers and banks and treated them approximately the
same. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220 (Regulation T), 221 (Regulation U) (1976). There were some
gaps even in this system, however. Lenders other than brokers, dealers, or banks (e.g.,
individuals or small-loan companies) were not subject to regulation. See 2 L. Loss, supra
note 5, at 1256-57 (2d ed. 1961). Also unregulated were loans made for another purpose,
such as a mortgage, which allowed investors to use funds for stock speculation that would
otherwise be tied up in property or other uses. Cf. 5 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 3275-76
(2d ed. 1961) (giving examples of how banks may extend credit on any collateral other
than "stock" for purpose of carrying securities of any kind).
42. Bank loans in amounts less than $25,000 come under the jurisdiction of the Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3), (5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). But Rule lOb-16 covers only margin
loans extended by brokers or dealers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1976). No mention is
made of banks, which are specifically excluded from the definition of the terms "broker"
and "dealer" in the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(4), (5) (1970).
43. For example, a $100,000 margin loan by a broker would be covered by the dis-
closure requirements of the Rule; the same loan by a bank would be outside the jurisdic-
tion of Truth in Lending. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (1970) ($25,000 limit on coverage)
with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16(a) (1976) (no limit on transaction size).
44. See p. 374 & notes 10-14 supra.
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that brokerage houses are exposed to huge Rule lOb-16 liabilities in
dealing with their larger customers,4 5 there are incentives for them
to get out of the business of making margin loans and to steer their
clients toward lenders not covered by the Rule. 46 Small as well as
large investors would be forced to borrow from banks, which would
not be covered by the special margin disclosure requirements of the
Rule.47 Furthermore, those brokers who continued to provide margin
credit would be forced to increase their charges to cover the cost of
insuring against the possibility of huge liability. These added costs and
inefficiencies imposed on the margin system would certainly be a far
cry from what Congress contemplated when it mandated a margin dis-
closure rule.
B. Remedies
The SEC may bring suits to enjoin violations of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.48 In addition, courts have recognized an implied
45. Potential liability could be very large, depending on external factors such as size
of account and performance of the market rather than extent or seriousness of violation.
See p. 393 & notes 79-81 infra.
46. In the past, when margin trading was rendered unattractive by high initial
margins, customers have turned to unregulated lenders for funds. See 2 L. Loss, supra
note 5, at 1257 (2d ed. 1961) (referring to such activities when margins were at 100% in
1946); Moore, How Traders Beat the 70% Margin, Bus. WEEK, April 8, 1967, at 51
(describing more recent practices).
47. It is possible that shifting more margin loans to banks would raise the cost of
credit for margin customers. First, interest rates on such loans might well be higher. Com-
petitive brokerage houses currently offer their large customers rates slightly below the
prime rate, see note 28 supra; it is doubtful that banks would want to be so generous.
Indeed, they would not make margin loans until the return on them was as great as the
return on other short-term business loans. Second, internal bank policies may preclude
the commitment of more than a certain percentage of bank assets to margin loans. If
brokers are no longer willing to make margin loans, the amount of funds available for
these loans will decline. As a result, the cost of margin loans will probably rise as a means
of apportioning the smaller amount of available money among potential margin clients.
Moreover, bank policy may require more collateral and more rapid margin calls than
current brokerage house practice. These factors could push margin customers away from
banks and toward other nonbroker lenders, who might be even more expensive. The
switch to banks and on to other lenders could thus generate added costs and inefficiencies
not contemplated by the lawmakers and hence is without a clear justification. Margin
could be made less attractive and thus could be curtailed as a speculative tool by the
operation of Rule 10b-16.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970.) The agency can also seek criminal sanctions. See generally
3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 234-35, 427-28; 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1975-
83 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 4108-23 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). In addition, the SEC can use
"threats of prosecution or proceedings, or the promise of light sanctions, or other forms
of negotiation, to obtain restitution for defrauded individuals." 3 A. BROMBERC, supra
note 5, § 10.2(l), at 237. Alternatively, the agency can go to court directly in aid of in-
dividuals seeking private relief. See id. § 10.2(2), at 236-39, 428; 3 L. Loss, supra note
5, at 1824-29 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3970-77 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). The 1934 Act also provides
for express private rights of action. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970) (§ 9 prohibition against
manipulation of securities registered on exchanges); id. § 78p(b) (1970) (§ 16(b) recovery
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private right of action under section 10(b). 49 Rule lOb-16 can prob-
ably be enforced by either of these means.
SEC injunctive suits brought under the Rule could be a useful
means of redress for certain nondisclosure violations with regard to
margin accounts.50 Indeed, given the Rule's nature as a securities law
regulation, such suits would be the only relief available where broker-
dealers had violated the margin restrictions but had not caused their
customers easily identifiable or measurable economic harm that could
be rectified in a private suit.5 ' Even where individual plaintiffs could
seek money damages, injunctive relief obtained by the SEC would
ensure benefits to the public as a whole through court-ordered changes
in margin information forms or disclosure procedures.
Injunctive relief, however, has limited value for margin account
holders. The potential of SEC suits to enjoin compliance with Rule
lOb-16 is circumscribed by the nature of the violations, practical and
legal limits on the agency's enforcement powers, and policy considera-
tions. Unlike certain other securities violations, such as stock manipula-
tion or insider trading, margin nondisclosures are difficult to police
because often there is no external manifestation of the wrong.5 2 For
by issuer of insiders' short-term trading profits); id. § 78r (1970) (§ 18 liability for mis-
leading statements filed with the SEC). See 2 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1040-90 (2d ed.
1961); 3 id. at 1746-54; 5 id. at 3003-50 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); 6 id. at 3860-63.
49. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Rule lOb-5);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Courts have implied a
private right of action for other sections of the 1934 Act that do not specifically authorize
one. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (§ 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970);
prohibition of fraud in tender offers); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1974) (§ 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970); margin regula-
tion); 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1757-97 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id., at 3865-3925 (2d ed. Supp.
1969); Comment, Tender Offers: An Analysis of the Early Development of Standing to
Sue Under Section 14(e), 5 TEXAs TECH. L. REv. 779 (1974).
50. Possible Rule lOb-16 violations can be divided into three basic categories: (1) non-
disclosure of some material aspect of the prospective credit transaction; (2) erroneous
disclosure, by accident or design, of some fact or figure, such as the interest rate; (3)
inadequate disclosure of a general policy with regard to margin maintenance calls, as in
Liang. SEC power to bring suit theoretically would apply to each situation.
51. Such a situation could arise in several ways. Disclosure of credit terms could be so
unsatisfactory as to deter a customer from opening or trading in a margin account. Or,
because of a favorable market, nondisclosures could mislead margin consumers without
causing them any discernible economic harm. Finally, violations might be harmful but
nonetheless unredressable because the plaintiff might well be unable to satisfy the in-
creasingly stringent requirements of a securities law cause of action. See pp. 388-90 infra.
52. Unexplained price changes and sudden increases in trading volume help alert the
Commission to possible violations of § 9 or § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Changes
in insider stock holdings, as indicated by forms filed with the agency, are evidence of
§ 16(b) trading. In addition, information passed on to the government by disgruntled
employees or partners may provide the basis for investigation of possible violations. For
lOb-16 violations, particularly margin call nondisclosures, however, an SEC investigation
would yield sparse results. Indications of violations of the Rule, far from manifesting
themselves in market behavior, would not even appear in an examination of a brokerage
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instance, the paradigmatic Rule lOb-16 violation, failure to disclose
margin call standards, can be detected only by observing the circum-
stances under which such calls are made; and individual plaintiffs
would be in a much better position than the SEC to evaluate whether
margin calls were made on the basis of the disclosed standards. Yet
even if the securities agency could develop an effective policing system,
lack of manpower suggests that many violations would go unnoticed
and unpunished.53 Since agency enforcement is normally for the
financially unsophisticated, 5' margin account holders should be re-
garded as at best secondary objects of agency concern.5 Finally, the
firm's financial records or statements of customers' accounts. The fact that the firm
failed to follow the margin call standards disclosed to customers, for instance, would not
be apparent from a review of the firm's records. Only where brokers had not "established
procedures to assure that each customer" was given the information required in the Rule
would the violation be easily discoverable. There would presumably be few violations of
this type.
53. Inadequate manpower for the policing and enforcement of the securities law has
long been a problem for the SEC. The need for a "supplement to Commission action" in
a field where the SEC was understaffed was one of the factors inducing the Supreme
Court to approve a private right of action under the proxy rules of the 1934 Act. See J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). As recently as March 1976, the SEC was
citing lack of personnel as a reason the Court should grant standing to a disappointed
tender offeror under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), an antifraud
section applying to mergers but quite similar to § 10(b). See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Ic., 430 U.S. 1, 24-26, 41-42, 64-65 (1977). This paucity of enforcement resources is a
particular problem in policing the margin regulations of the 1934 Act, so that private
rights of action thus play a significant role in § 7 litigation. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 354 (1972). If the SEC lacks the
manpower necessary for the enforcement of major sections and rules of the 1934 Act, it
would have even fewer resources to devote to detection of violations of the rules it
perceives as less important or more limited in scope.
54. This is the assumption of the Truth in Lending Act. See 1967 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 18. Courts interpreting the statute have agreed. See, e.g., Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Thus, it has
been stated repeatedly that Congress established the disclosure provisions of the various
securities acts expressly to protect small or gullible investors. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363
(1966) (policy of federal securities laws to protect uninformed, ignorant, and gullible in-
vestors); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (disclosure provisions of
securities laws designed to protect small investors). See also SEC, SUMMARY OF DISCLOSURE
POLICY STUDY REPORT (WHEAT REPORT), [1963-1972 Special Studies Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 74,603, at 65,241 (1969) (primary purpose of congressional disclosure
policy to provide investors with "enough information to enable them to arrive at their
own rational decisions"). As the agency charged with the enforcement of the securities
laws, the SEC has often urged safeguards for "unsophisticated investors." S. REP. No.
1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940) (discussing the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). Cf.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1963) (discussing SECs
study of investment trusts and companies which led to 1940 Act). See Levenson, The
Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 Bus. LAW. 61 (1971).
55. This is perhaps an ancillary reason why no SEC actions have yet been prosecuted.
If the agency felt that margin customers did not really need protection or could better
look after their own interests through private suits, it would have an added incenti'.e to
make Rule l0b-16 violations a low-priority enforcement item. Small margin investors,
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effectiveness of SEC protection of margin customers will be diminished
by judicially imposed restrictions on Commission lawsuits.50 This per-
haps explains why no SEC injunctive suits under the Rule have as yet
been brought.
Given the limitations of SEC injunctive suits, private actions will
probably be the primary method of enforcing Rule lOb-16. 5 7 Indeed, a
private right of action is essential if economic damages flowing from
margin violations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
are to be redressed. The benefits available to investors from such
private actions, however, are limited both by the elements that must
be proved to establish a cause of action and by the measure of damages
recoverable in a successful suit. The result is a scheme of regulation
that is both irrational in its operation and inconsistent with the con-
sumer protection intent that Congress manifested in the Truth in
Lending Act.58
however, may still be perceived to require the benefits of scaled-down enforcement of
Rule lOb-16 more than wealthy and knowledgeable margin speculators. See p. 375 &
note 18 supra.
56. The SEC has been required in an injunctive suit to establish scienter on the part
of the defendant and to show that the alleged violations would be repeated. See SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This requirement, which ap-
pears to flow from the language of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
would make SEC suits more difficult to prosecute successfully. See Berner & Franklin,
Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Actions: A Re-
appraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 769 (1976). Proving scienter would
probably be particularly difficult in a 10b-16 injunctive suit, since a violation would
hardly ever arise except in cases of brokerage house ignorance or negligence. Defendants
would seldom act with scienter, because there is usually little to gain from misrepresenta-
tion.
57. Courts have allowed plaintiffs to maintain private rights of action for violations
of SEC Rules lOb-5 and lOb-6. See note 49 supra (Rule 1Ob-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (Rule 10b-6); cf. id. (intimating private right under Rule lOb-13).
The argument that private damage actions are cognizable under Rule lOb-16 is further
supported by the Supreme Court's holding that causes of action for violations of Rule
10b-5 arise under § 10(b) and not under the Commission's Rule. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (scope of Rule lOb-5 "cannot exceed the power
granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)").
The Liang court, in discussing a possible recovery under Rule lOb-16, stated: "It may
safely be assumed that noncompliance with Rule lOb-16 provides the basis for a private
cause of action. It is already established that a violation of Rule lOb-5, a rule of dis-
closure analogous to Rule 1Ob-16, implies a civil remedy." 540 F.2d at 1113 n.25. The
right of plaintiff to sue was not questioned in the only other case to interpret 1Ob-16,
Stephens v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
In implying a private right of action under the margin regulations of § 7 of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), the Second Circuit stressed the importance of private actions
to the regulatory scheme: "the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous
investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of private suits
for compensatory damages can have upon brokers and dealers above and beyond the
threats of governmental action by the Securities and Exchange Commission." Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1974).
58. It could be argued that if the Rule's private enforcement leads to irrational
results, the Rule should be construed as not having a private damage remedy, since
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The threshold element necessary to establish an implied private
cause of action under Rule 1Ob-16 is standing. Section 10(b) differs from
other sections of the 1934 Act dealing with violations for which private
remedies have been implied in that it speaks specifically of fraudulent
practices "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."' ' 0
Courts have thus held that plaintiffs who bring private damage actions
under section 10(b) must be purchasers or sellers of securities.00 The
language of Rule 10b-16 itself also suggests that plaintiffs must be
purchasers or sellers of securities because of the Rule's prohibition of
nondisclosure violations "in connection with any securities transac-
tion."6 1
several of the other § 10(b) rules are enforced only through SEC action. One of the
reasons Rule l0b-16 appeared as a § 10(b) rather than a § 15(c) rule of the 1934 Act was
because the Commission planned for margin investors to be able to rely on the private
right of action afforded by § 10(b). See Interviews, supra note 27. Moreover, given the
problems of SEC enforcement, see pp. 385-87 & notes 52-56 supra, absence of a private
right of action in Rule 10b-16 would leave the protected class of margin investors with
hardly any protection at all.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (§ 10(b)). Compare id. with § 14(e), id. § 78n(e) (for-
bidding fraudulent and manipulative practices "in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to
or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation"). It is generally agreed that the
language of § 14(e) eliminates the Birnbaum sale-purchase limitation, see Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), and broadens
standing to bring suit under the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969); McCloskey
v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279, 1281-82 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note
5, § 6.3 (1010), at 122.16-.17.
60. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See gen-
erally 2 A. BROBERG, supra note 5, § 8.8, at 221-22.1; 3 id. § 8.8, at 423-24.5; 3 L. Loss,
supra note 5, at 1472-73 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3644-46 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). In reaffirming
the Birnbaum rule, the Blue Chip Court listed among its reasons for accepting the
purchaser-seller requirement the following "policy" considerations: the possibility of
vexatious litigation in the absence of such a rule, the danger that suits would deal with
hazy factual issues relating to whether or not a plaintiff would have purchased or sold
the stock, and the problem that proof would depend on uncorroborated oral testimony.
421 U.S. at 737-49. These policies are also applicable to private actions for violations of
Rule 10b-16.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16(a) (1976). Such a standing limitation would probably not
hinder most aggrieved margin customers, who would have bought or sold securities in
their account during the period of nondisclosure. Yet Rule lOb-16 standing would be
denied in cases of a violation without a corresponding purchase or forced sale. See, e.g.,
note 50 supra. Other examples could include nondisclosure violation arising in a margin
account opened with the deposit or transfer of stock already owned by the client, rather
than by a purchase or sale of new stock; or a margin call made pursuant to an im-
properly disclosed margin system which was met by a cash transfer rather than by a
forced sale of collateral. Although it could be argued that any of these various events
would represent a "securities transaction" within the meaning of Rule 1Ob-16, the ques-
tion is far from clear.
Even if these events could satisfy the "securities transaction" language of the Rule,
moreover, they would still have to hurdle the "purchase or sale" language of § 10(b). Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976), held that causes of action arise under
§ 10(b) and not Rule lOb-5, and that a Rule's "scope cannot exceed the power granted
388
Regulation of Margin Credit
The "purchase or sale" standing requirement of section 10(b) is con-
siderably stricter than the analogous provision of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, which allows recoveries for damages suffered "in connection
with any consumer credit transaction."6 2 Thus although under the
Act a plaintiff can recover for any nondisclosure of credit terms
merely upon proof of the violation, a similar nondisclosure under the
Rule is actionable only if accompanied by the purchase or sale of a
security. To prove a section 10(b) violation the plaintiff must also show
that the alleged Rule lOb-16 nondisclosure involved material margin
information,63 induced reliance on his part,64 caused the harm com-
the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)." The conclusion that the purchase or sale
requirement is applicable to Rule lOb-16 is further supported by cases decided before
Hochielder that had considered standing under the other § 10(b) rules. See Bache & Co.
v. International Controls Corp., 324 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 339 F. Supp. 341
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972) (Rule lOb-4 violation raised as defense);
Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Rule 10b-6); Miller v. Steinbach, 268
F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Rule lOb-6); SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Rule l0b-6). But see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 378 & n.32 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). This language was broadened in 1974 to read: "any
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part . . . with
respect to any person is liable to such person." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975).
The requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a connection between the defendant,
or his actions, and the challenged consumer credit transaction has not proved onerous.
See, e.g., Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975) (separate
promisees under mortgage loan could be held individually liable); Manning'v. Princeton
Consumer Discount Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976) (automobile dealer arranging credit, not loan company, liable for non-
disclosures); Childress v. Mobile Living Corp., 386 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd
memt., 525 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1976) (one arranging for the extension of credit to con-
sumer and receiving from another party fee therefor could be liable for nondisclosures);
Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (creditor liable to
plaintiff for failure to disclose annual interest rate on monthly statement, even though
no finance charges had yet been incurred).
63. See generally 2 A. BROM IERG, supra note 5, § 8.3, at 199-202; 3 id. § 8.3 at 419-20.
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the materiality test requires a showing
of a "substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations" of reasonable shareholders. TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Earlier tests of materiality required
only that the nondisclosures might have been important in influencing plaintiffs' actions.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970). Hence, although materiality standards might be
easier to meet given the direct personal interaction between margin account broker and
customer, see 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 8.3, at 199, potential Rule lOb-16 plaintiffs
may still encounter difficulties.
64. See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 8.6, at 209-12; 3 id. § 8.6, at 420.7-
421; 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1765-66 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3876-90 (2d ed. Supp. 1969);
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 584 (1975). Reliance is particularly difficult to establish in Rule lOb-5 actions,
especially since a plaintiff claiming nondisclosure violations must prove that he believed
the opposite facts to be true and acted upon this misconception. See List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). Hence, the Supreme
Court has held that "positive proof" of reliance is not essential if plaintiff establishes the
materiality of the alleged nondisclosure. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
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plained of,05 and occurred with scienter on the part of the defendant.""
Because a plaintiff must establish these five elements for a successful
Rule lOb-16 cause of action, private damage suits under the Rule
provide considerably less protection to margin account holders than
the parent Truth in Lending Act provides to other credit customers.
For instance, although the Rule's "purchase or sale" standing require-
ment would probably be deemed satisfied by the initial purchase in
the account whose terms were the subject of a nondisclosure viola-
tion, 6T or by the forced sale due to inability to meet an improperly
disclosed margin call,6" not all courts would necessarily reach this
65. See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 8.7, at 213-20; 3 id. § 8.7, at 421-23;
6 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 3880-83 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Since very few cases have dealt
with the question, Rule lOb-5 causation law is still somewhat unclear. Nonetheless, exist-
ing cases require a showing of some causal connection between the misconduct alleged and
the economic loss suffered. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
154 (1972) (requiring causation in fact); cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
385 (1970) (if materiality established, requisite causation proved if misleading proxy
statement was "an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction"). Exceptions
to the causation requirement are usually based on grounds of public policy. See Weber
v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Whatever the rigor of the judicial standards, margin customers would frequently have
difficulty proving that the nondisclosure caused their harm. In the case of a forced sale,
the margin call would be caused by a decline in the value of the stocks held on margin,
not by nondisclosure of the standards for making the call. Even if some courts were to
accept nondisclosure as an indirect cause, plaintiffs would often lose on this issue, since
some judges have stated quite explicitly that the securities laws are not a s)stem of in-
vestors' insurance. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). For a discussion of the kind of causation required in a lOb-16 private action
dealing with the additional collateral requirement, see 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1050, 1075-76.
The author suggests that a plaintiff could allege causation by asserting that "had he
known of defendant's collateral policies (I) he would have found another broker-dealer
who would not have called for collateral when the defendant did; or (2) he would not
have purchased stock on margin at all." Id. at 1075. It is even less clear what kind of
allegations would be required in a claim for damages based on a nondisclosure of the
proper interest rate, although allegations similar to those outlined above would usually
suffice to establish a cause of action. Proof, of course, is a different matter.
66. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
§ 10(b) civil liability arises only upon proof that the defendant acted with scienter,
generally in Rule lob-5 an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. See generally 2 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 8.4(000)-(120), (500)-(659), at 203-204.1, 204.101-.258; 3 id. § 8.4
(500), at 420-420.7; 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1766 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3883-88 (2d ed.
Supp. 1961). Scienter may be difficult for margin customers to prove. Many brokerage
firms will have revised their margin agreements to comply, at least facially, with the
new requirements of Rule lOb-16. Demonstration that such revisions were made with
an intent to deceive, or that the presentation of such forms to new customers was an
intentionally deceptive act, would probably not be easy.
67. The acquisition of a security in the marketplace would obviously qualify as a
"purchase" under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and if the nondisclosure occurred "in connec-
tion" with the purchase, a § 10(b) cause of action could be alleged. See note 59 supra. Of
course, until a sale occurred, there would be no measurable economic loss.
68. This represents the third type of Rule lOb-16 violation described in note 50
supra. As is demonstrated by the Liang case, customers who failed to meet a margin call
in a falling market, provoking a sale of securities from their account, could sue under
the Rule. Yet, it is hard to see how the other two types of %iolations could consistently be
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conclusion. Even if standing to bring suit were established, plaintiffs
would find it difficult to meet the other requirements of a section
10(b) cause of action, either because courts have construed these ele-
ments against plaintiffs with increasing severity69 or because of eviden-
tiary problems peculiar to the Rule.7 0 The prospect of relief held out
by a private Rule lOb-16 suit may well prove illusory.
This dissimilarity between the protection offered by the Truth in
Lending Act and Rule 10b-16 might be explained as evidence of a
congressional intent to provide fewer safeguards for margin customers
because they are sophisticated investors.7 1 Yet by conditioning recovery
on the fortuity of a purchase and sale accompanying a nondisclosure,
the Rule fails to scale down protection of this group in any rational
way. If the current disclosure provisions of the Rule were violated in
the absence of a corresponding securities transaction, for example, the
section 10(b) standing requirement would not be satisfied. Further-
more, plaintiffs' frequent inability to meet the other requirements of
a Rule 10b-16 suit introduces even greater disparities in protection,
since it means that most lOb-16 violations are not redressable by
private parties.72 Thus, unlike Truth in Lending's automatic recovery
actionable. A misstatement or nondisclosure of the interest rate would not occasion a
forced sale through the mechanism of a margin call, and other nondisclosures might not
either. The only one of these situations clearly actionable under the Rule would be
where a customer was induced to open and trade in an account by the seeming attractive-
ness of misrepresented credit terms. But such a violation would also be a Rule 10b-5
infraction. See p. 395 & notes 88-90 infra.
69. Defendants before the Supreme Court have prevailed with increasing frequency in
actions brought under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977) (§ 14(e)); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (§ 14(a)); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (§ 10(b)); Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Sec.
Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (§ 16(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975) (§ 10(b)); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973) (§ 16(b)); notes 62, 63 & 66 supra.
70. See notes 62-66 supra. Proof problems involved with materiality, reliance, causa-
tion, and scienter are examined in 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1050, 1066-76. The author there con-
cludes that "[p]roving scienter and causation may be particularly difficult for the rule
lOb-16 plaintiff." Id. at 1079.
71. If this is Congress's intent, it is ill-expressed and does not fit well with the other
evidence. See pp. 374-76 & notes 15-22 supra. Indications are that the legislators wanted
margin customers to receive protection similar to that afforded other consumers by Truth
in Lending, qualified only by the SEC's determination of the specific type of information
that needed to be disclosed to margin investors. See pp. 377-78 & note 27 supra. It is
doubtful that the different recovery standards of Act and Rule were considered by the
Congress; certainly it did not expressly sanction a lesser measure of protection for margin
account holders.
72. In this respect, the Rule fails to accomplish the intent of its drafters at the
SEC, who believed that promulgation of Rule lOb-16 as a § 10(b) rule would allow
vigorous private enforcement of the disclosure requirements. See Interviews, supra note
27. Such a belief was not surprising in 1968, when § 10(b) was expanding as a tool of
securities law enforcement. However, the ascendancy of restrictive interpretations of the
various elements of a § 10(b) cause of action seriously impairs Rule lOb-16's ability to
function as an individual investor protection measure.
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system, Rule 1Ob-16's securities law structure creates a situation in
which violations of the Rule rarely produce damage awards for ag-
grieved margin customers.
The inadequacy of the remedies offered by Rule lOb-16 is com-
pounded by the absence of a broadly applicable damage formula for
violations of the Rule. No court has considered the measure of dam-
ages in a Rule lOb-16 private suit.7" It is likely that courts would adopt
a measure of damages74 similar to that in other section 10(b) actions.75
This damage formula is inconsistent with that of the Truth in Lending
Act. Under the Act, damages are limited and are automatic when a
credit nondisclosure violation occurs.76 Under a section 10(b) cause of
action, damages are not in any way fixed but depend rather on the
showing of economic harm caused by the violation. 7 If the damage
measure urged by the plaintiffs in Liang were adopted, recovery would
73. The Liang court remanded for a determination, inter alia, of "what recovery, if
any, is appropriate for any noncompliance with [the] Rule." 540 F.2d at 1113 (footnotes
omitted).
74. A court would have several choices. Private damage awards could be based on the
interest charges in the transaction, as in the Truth in Lending Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640
(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Another possibility would be the type of recovery sought in the
Liang case, the difference between the price the securities brought upon forced sale and
the amount for which they could have been sold "within a reasonable time thereafter."
540 F.2d at 1110. This resembles one of the usual § 10(b) recovery formulas. See note 77
infra. Finally, there could be no private damages at all. The Liang court raised this
specter when it spoke of a 1Ob-16 "recovery, if any." 540 F.2d at 1113 (emphasis added).
75. This is so not only because of the existence of § 10(b) damage formulas, see note
77 infra, but also because of the unsatisfactory nature of alternative damage standards.
Awards linked to interest charges are in no way suggested by the language or case law
of the 1934 Act, or by the general terms of the Rule. Not awarding damages at all, the
other possibility, would render the private right of action virtually useless.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975); note 12 supra.
77. As Professors Bromberg and Loss point out, there is little decisional law on proper
damage standards under § 10(b) because few Rule lOb-5 cases reach the relief stage. 3 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 225; 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1792-93 (2d ed. 1961).
However, "[diefrauded buyers who have prevailed on the merits have typically recovered
their purchase price on a rescission measure of damages .... Prevailing defrauded sellers
have done better by virtue of a constructive-trust approach, which gives them whatever
profits the buyer has garnered on resale." 3 A. Bromberg, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 226-27.
Another measure for sellers is "the difference between price and value at the time of the
transaction." Id. at 227. For a general survey of Rule lob-5 damages, with illustrative
cases, see id. § 9.1-2, at 225-29, 424.11-427; 3 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1792-97 (2d ed.
1961); 6 id. at 3920-25 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
A possible § 10(b) damage formula is suggested in 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1050, 1076-78. The
author proposes the damage standard suggested by the Liangs, see note 78 infra (differ-
ence between actual sales price and sales value within a reasonable time thereafter), in
situations where a plaintiff "can show that but for the defendant's breach of the rule, he
would have dealt with a broker-dealer with more favorable margin policies." 51 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. at 1076. In cases where "a customer alleges that but for the broker-dealer's unlawful
act, the customer would not have opened a margin account at all," the author suggests
that a plaintiff's damages be represented by "the difference between the price originally
paid for the stock, and the price of the stock when he finally sold it at a loss." Id. at
1076-77.
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be based on the luck of the marketplace rather than on the harm
suffered.Th Speculative recoveries would thus be controlled by such
factors as the market behavior of stocks held on margin,T the circum-
stance of how near a particular investor happened to be to a margin
callp 0 and the purely individual response of each investor to a request
for more funds."' In effect, such a damage standard for Rule lOb-16
would underwrite speculative losses and hence reward those who were
both less conservative and more fortunate than other investors.
Under a more rational Rule lOb-16 damage formula,8 2 damages
would be minimal. In the case of an improperly disclosed margin sys-
tem, damages would result only from the customer's lack of knowledge
regarding when the margin call would have been made.83 In most in-
78. The Liangs suggested a recovery formula based on the Texas Gulf Sulphur litiga-
tion, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971). See 540 F.2d at 1110. Such a measure of damages is inappropriate be-
cause Rule lOb-16 violations would not cause any fluctuations in the price of securities,
and a recovery based on price changes in a stock would be unreasonable.
Perhaps a more equitable damage formula would be based on a refunding by the
broker to the plaintiff of the amount of interest or commissions paid by him as a result
of transactions in a margin account. Such a formula would more closely approximate the
harm caused by margin nondisclosures. This would be somewhat analogous to recoveries
in § 10(b) cases involving "churning," a practice in which brokers encourage excessive and
fruitless trading in order to increase their brokerage fees. In such cases, courts have
"generally allowed the recovery . . . of the total amount of the commissions paid, but not
any loss in the market value of the portfolio." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 690 (4th ed. 1977). See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). Such a Rule lOb-16 damage formula, however, would
seldom yield results. See pp. 393-94 & notes 82-86 infra.
79. That a stock is bought on margin by many people may tend to make it more
volatile. The factors of natural and margin-induced volatility would make certain stocks
subject to rapid swings in price. Given the damage formula put forth in Liang, maximum
recoveries would be possible when the stock in question fell, was sold, and then rose
very rapidly.
80. No matter how much the margin client might have been deceived, he would only
be damaged if he were sold out by his broker at a loss. If the margin customer profits
by his margin trading, the nondisclosure has not caused him apparent harm. In other
words, if he never came near getting a margin call because his stocks performed
moderately well, he would be unable to establish Rule lOb-16 damages.
81. Conservative or liquid investors who responded to a margin call with the required
cash or additional collateral may be unable to recover under Rule lOb-16. Yet they may
still have been harmed because they had to sell assets, borrow money, or suffer some
other financial embarrassment in order to obtain the necessary funds.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. This is so because the Rule lOb-16 violation in no way affects the price of the
security. The real harm would thus come from the plaintiff's uncertainty about the
timing of a margin call. Though it could be argued that any economic losses flowing
from that uncertainty, such as opportunity costs of remaining liquid enough to meet the
unexpected margin call, should be recompensed, there is an important factor militating
against such recoveries. Since market fluctuations, which cannot be anticipated, control
the timing of a call, it seems unfair to allow recoveries because of the existence of a
disclosure violation that was not in any real way a cause of the plaintiff's harm. For
even if the disclosure violation had not occurred, the plaintiff would still have been un-
certain about the timing of a margin call. See note 39 supra. Given the nature of a Rule
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stances, it would be difficult to show that the nondisclosure caused
harm to the plaintiff, and recovery would thus be a sometime event8 4
In the instances where damages could be proved,85 however, an action
could be brought under Rule lOb-5 for failure to disclose material
information."0 Thus Rule lOb-16 adds little to the section 10(b) en-
forcement arsenal. At best, it is merely a catalogue of the kind of
information the SEC considers material in disclosures concerning a
margin account;8 7 at worst, it is a misleading Rule that offers plaintiffs
more protection and damage recovery prospects than it can deliver.
III. A Proposal for Regulation of Margin Interest Rates
The inadequate protection afforded margin customers by Rule lOb-
16 raises serious questions about the propriety of using the securities
laws, oriented as they are toward protection of the investing public
and regulation of the securities markets, to implement a regulatory
system inspired by an Act devised to protect financially naive con-
sumers in general credit transactions. If Congress determines that
margin investors need the disclosures required by Rule lOb-16, it
lOb-16 violation, all a plaintiff could prove would be that, had he known all the facts
about margin call standards, he would either have traded with a different broker or not
have opened a margin account at all. See 51 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1050, 1076-78. The plaintiff
usually could not claim that he would not have speculated at all; merely that he could
not have done so on margin. The only real damages would thus probably be the interest
charges (and, possibly, the commissions) he had paid in the margin account. Such
damages would be much smaller than claims based on potentially wide price fluctuations
in individual securities purchased.
84. The plaintiff would have to establish that he would have acted differently had
he known all the facts about the margin account. This would doubtless be a difficult
burden, as courts are seldom sympathetic to claims under the securities laws based on
arguments that plaintiff would have done something differently but for the nondisclosure
violation. One of the reasons for this attitude is an awareness of the proof problems
caused by allowing such claims. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (recovery to Rule lOb-5 plaintiff based on claim that he would have
bought stock denied). Assuming plaintiffs were allowed to argue such theories, they
would have to establish that they relied on the improperly disclosed information, which
somehow caused their economic loss. Reliance and causation are not easy § 10(b) elements
to prove. See notes 64 & 65 supra.
85. These damages would involve interest rates and commissions. See note 83 supra.
86. Any Rule lOb-16 nondisclosure violation which causes economic harm would by
its very nature be a nondisclosure of information that was material to the plaintiff. See
note 63 supra. Hence, recoverable Rule lOb-16 violations would be violations of Rule
lOb-5.
87. The difficulty with Rule lOb-16 comes from the fact that any violation of the
Rule that leads to recoverable damages is also a violation of Rule lOb-5, because the
information not disclosed was material to the plaintiff. See note 86 supra. The rest of
Rule lOb-16 is relatively useless. Violations of other portions of the Rule, which could
not be brought as Rule 10b-5 violations, are not as a practical matter enforceable through
private suits since they do not generate any recoveries. They would thus only be the
grounds for SEC enforcement actions.
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could achieve a more rational system geared toward fulfillment of the
legislative goals of both the Truth in Lending Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Such a system of dealing with margin credit
abuses would offer two separate remedies, each of which corresponds
to a type of abuse. These remedies would derive from the Truth in
Lending Act and the SEC's Rule 1Ob-5, respectively.
Such a bifurcated system requires repeal of the exemption of margin
credit from the purview of the Truth in Lending Act. Placing stock
and commodity margin transactions under the Act would allow wide-
spread but limited recoveries for all interest rate abuses, regardless of
whether they are securities law violations. Reliance on Truth in Lend-
ing would also avoid the standing and materiality problems of the
securities laws and guarantee recovery to all victims of nondisclosures,
regardless of their individual trading practices.
Rule lOb-16 should be withdrawn as a separate section 10(b) regula-
tion. Rule 1Ob-5, s8 however, would remain as a remedy for abuses in
connection with margin transactions. In cases where genuine damages
going beyond mere nondisclosure of interest rates had occurred in
connection with margin transactions, suits alleging margin credit vio-
lations could be brought as Rule lOb-5 causes of action. Theory and
some precedent already exist for use of Rule lOb-5 in this manner,89
as is indicated by the SEC's assertion that margin violations constitute
"manipulative devices" as that term is used in section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.90
With the repeal of Rule lOb-16, SEC regulation of collateral dis-
closure requirements would cease.9 ' The transfer of interest rate regula-
tion to the Truth in Lending Act would reflect the general intent of
Congress concerning disclosure of credit terms and would tend to treat
margin customers the same as other consumers of credit, within the
limits set by the Act. This change of jurisdiction from one statute to
another would neither conflict with nor diminish the authority and
88. This regulation, unlike Rule lOb-16, has been extensively developed by courts. See
pp. 388-90, 392 and notes 59-66 & 73-77 supra.
89. Various misrepresentations with regard to margin accounts have been the basis
for Rule lOb-5 claims. See Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956) (incorrect information
as to margin that would be required); Glickman v. Schweickhart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (representation that complete financing would be no riskier than regular
margin).
90. The SEC suggested that nondisclosure of certain facts about a margin account may
represent a violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See George D.
Curtis, [1972] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,651 (SEC 1971) (failure of broker-dealer to
disclose time limit within which customer must supply additional margin).
91. As a result, the system and canons of regulation governing deposit of collateral and
margin maintenance calls would be left as they are now, with the interplay of Federal
Reserve Board and stock or commodity exchange control. See note 8 supra.
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reach of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which exhibits, in sec-
tion 10(b) and elsewhere, an intention on the part of Congress that
investors be protected from fraud in connection with securities transac-
tions. Rather, the scheme proposed would enhance the effectiveness
and rationality of the 1934 Act in this area, for it would terminate an
unsatisfactory experiment which forced the Commission to draft a rule
serving two very different congressional policies.
Conclusion
The dual remedy system outlined above would represent a rational
response to Congress's perception that margin investors need to be
protected by federally mandated disclosure. Although it is far from
clear that margin customers as a group are so powerless economically
that they need congressional protection, if protection is needed the dis-
closures required by Rule lOb-16 are of little value. Before reasserting
direct federal control over this facet of the securities industry, Con-
gress should investigate more carefully the needs of margin traders
as a class and reconsider the value of disclosures in margin transactions,
far removed as they are from the small consumer credit purchases with
which Truth in Lending is concerned. Such an investigation, which
was not undertaken in 1967 by either Congress or the SEC, may well
prompt the legislators to leave margin transactions outside the reach of
disclosure requirements entirely.
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